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^O},IMENTS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUN]TY ON THE AMENDMENTS OF
22 JUNE L982 TO THE U.S. EXPORT ADMINISTRATION REGULATIONS
I Introduction
1- on June 22, L982, ttre Department of conunercerat the
direction of President Reagan and pursuant to section 6 of
the Export Administration Actramended sections 376.L2, 37g.g
and 385.2 of the Export Administration Regurations. These
amend.ments amounted to an expansion of the existing u.s.
controls on the export and re-export of good,s and technicar
data rerating to oil and gas exploration, exploitation,
transmission and refinement.
The European conmunity believes that the u.s. regulations, as
amended,contain sweeping extensi.o4rs of U.S. jurisdiction which
are unlawful under international law. Moreover, the new regu-
lations and the way in which ttrey affect contracts, in course
of perfoErnEnc€rseem bo.run counter to criteria of ttre Export
administration Act'and arso to certain principles of u.s.
public law.
2. The main ttrrust of the regulations may be summarized as
follows:
First of allr p€ESons within a third country may not re-export
machinery for the expLoration, production, transmission or
refinement of oil and natural 9as, or components thereof, Lt
it is of U.S. origin, without permission of the U.S. Government.
Moreoverr any person subject to the jurisdiction of ttre United
states (1) is required to get prior written authorization rrom
the office of Export Administration for export and re-export
to the u.s.s.R. of non-u.s. goods and technical data related
to oil and gas exploration, production, transmission and
refinement.
t'inallyr no person in the u.s. or in a foreign country may
export or re-export to the u.s.s.R. foreign products directly
derived frorn u.s. technical 63ga(2) rerating to machinery etc.
utilized for ttre exploration, production or transmission or
refinement of petroleum or natural gas or commodities produced
in plants based on such U.S. technical data.
This prohibition applies in three alternative situations, nameJ.y:
if written assurance $ras requireh under the u.s. Export
Regulations when the data were exported;
(1) Now defined as (I) any person wherever located who is a citizen-or resident of the United States, (II) any person actually
within the united states; (rrr) any corporation organized
under the laws of the united states i or (rv) any pirtnership,association, corporation or other organization, wherever or-ganized or doing business, that is owned or controlled bypersons specified in paragraphs (f), (II) or (III)
(21 This expression is very broadly defined in 15 CFR para.
379 .1
li
3if any person subject tc the jurisdiction of the u.s.A. (as
defined in Note(3))r"".ives royalties or other compensation
for, or has licensed, the use of the technicar data concerned,
regardless of when the data were exported from ttre U.S.;
if the recipient of the U.S. technical data agreed (in the
licensing lgreement or other contracts) to abide by U.S.
Export Control Regulations.
3. The following comments will discuss firstly the international
legal aspects of the U.S. measures, including (A) ttre generally
recognized bases on which jurisdiction can be founded in inter-
national law and (B) other bases of jurisdiction which might be
invoked by the U.S. Government; secondly, the rules and principles
as laid down in U.S. law, in particular the Export Administration
Act, and as applied by U.S. Courtsr.'which would seem to be at
variance with the amendments of"Jirne 22, Lg82.
/.
(3) Now defined as (I) any person wherever located who is a
citizen or resident of the United States, (II) any person
actually within the United States; (III) any corporation
organized under the laws of the United States or of anyState, TerritoEyr Possession or District of the UnitedStatesi or (IV) any partnership, association, corporation
or other organization, wherever organized or doing business,that is owned, or controlled by persons specified in para-graphs (I), (II) or (III)
4II. The Amendments und.er International Law
A. Generally Accepted Bases of Jurisdiction in fnternatj-onal
Law
4. The U.S. measures as they apply in the present case are
unacceptable under international law because of ttreir extra-
territorial aspects. They seek to regulate companies not of
U.S. nationality in respect of their conduct outside the United
States and particularly ttre handling of property and technical
data of these companies not within the United States.
They seek to impose on non-U.S. companies the restriction of
U.S. law by threatening them with d.lscriminatory sanctions in
the field of trade which are incgnsistent wittr the normal
comnercial practice established between the U.S. and the E.C.
In this way the amendments of June 22, L982, run counter to
the two generally accepted bases of jurisdiction in international
]awt the territoriality and ttre nationalitlz principles(4) '
E. The territorialitv principle (i.e. the notion that a State
should restrict its rule-making in principle to persons and goods
within its territory and that an organization like the EuroPean
Community should restrict the applicability of its rule to the
territory to which the Treaty setting it up applies) is a
fundamental notion of international law, in particular insofar
as it concerns the regulation of the social and economic activity
in a State. The principle that each State - and mutatis mutandis
the Community insofar as Powers have been transferred to it -
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has the right freely to organize and deverop its social and
economic system has been confirmed many times in international
fora. The Anerican neasures crearly infringe the principle of
territoriarity, since they purport to regulate the activities
of companies in the 8.C., not under the territorial competence
of the U.S.
6. The nationalitv principle (i.e. the prescription of rures
for nationars, wherever they are) cannot serve as a basis for
the extension of U.S. jurisdiction resulting from the amendments,
i.e. (r) over companies incorporated in E.c. Member states, on
the basis of some corporate link (parent-subsidiary) or personal
Iink (e.g. shareholding) to the U.S., (II) over companies in-
corporated in E.C. Member States, either because they have a
tie to a U.S.-incorporated company, .subsidiary or other xU.S.
controlled" company ttrrough a ltbdnsing agreement, royalty
paymentsr or payment of other compensation, or because they have
bought certain goods originating in the U.S.
7. Ad (I) Ehe amendments in two places purport to subject to
U.S. jurisdiction companies, wherever organized or doing business,
which are subsidiaries of U.S. companies or under the control of
U.S. citizens, U.S. residents or even persons actually within
ttre U.S. This implies that the United States is seeking to impose
its corporate nationality on companies of which the great majority
are incorporated and have their registered office elsewhere,
notably in E.C. Member States.
Such action is not in conformity with recognized principles of
the Internationalinternational law. fn the Barcelona Tr etion ease -
6Court of Justice declared that two traditional criteria for
determining the nationality of companies, i.e. the place of
incorporation and the place of the registered office of the
company concerned, had been "confirmed by long practice and
by numerous international instruments". The Court also
scrutinized other tests of corporate nationality, but con-
cluded that ttrese had not found general acceptance. The Court
consequentllz placed primary emphasis on the place of incorporation
and the registered office in deciding the case in point (5) .
This decision was taken within the framework of the doctrine of
d.iplomatic protection, but reflects a general principle of
international law.
8. aa (II) The notion inherenb i.n the subjection to U.S. juris-
diction of companies with no tie to ttre U.S. whatsoever, except
for a technological link to a U.S. companyr or through possession
of U.S. origin goods, can only be that this technology or such
goods should somehow be considered as undlterably "American"
(even though many of the patents involved are registered in the
Member States of the European Community). This seems the only
possible explanation for the U.S. regulations given the fact
that national security is not at stake here (see below under B).
Goods and technology do not have any nationality and there are
no known rules under international 1aw for using Eoods or
technology situated abroad as a basis of establishing jurisdiction
over the persons controlling them. Several Court cases confirm
that U.S. jurisdiction does not foIlow U.S. origin goods once
they have been discharged in the territory of another country(6) '
./.
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9 - The amendments of 22 June L992, therefore, cannot be justi-
fied under the nationalitv principle, because they ignore the
two criteria for determining the nationality of companies re-
confirmed by ttre rnternational Court of Justice and because they
purport to give some notion of "nationalityl to goods and
technologies so as to establish jurisdiction over persons handling
them.
The purported direct extension of u.s. jurisdiction to non-u.s.
incorporated companies not using u.s. origin technology or com-
ponents is a fortiori objectionable to the E.C. because neither
of these (in themselves invarid) justifications courd appIy.
L0. The last mentioned case exemplifies to what extent the whole-
sale infringement of the nationality principle exacerbates the
infringement of the territoriariti, principle(7). Thus even E.c.-.
incorporated companies in ttre example mentioned above, according
to the amendmentsrwould have to ask special written permission
not of the E.c. bu.t of the u.s. authorities in order to obtain
permission to export goods produced in the E.c. and based on
E.c. technology from the territory, to which the E.c. Treaties
applyrto ttre u.s.s.R. The practicar impact of the amend.nents to
the Export Administration Regulations is tiat E.C. companies are
pressed into service to carra/ out U.S. trade policy towards ttre
u.s.s.R., even though these companies are incorporated and have
their registered office within the Community which has its own
trade policy towards the U.S,S.R.
(7) Th" applicati.or,- or)lBtiolality principle wourd impry ipsofacto some overlapping with the- applilation of thE teriFffiLity principle and this is alleptable under internationallaw, in some instances, but we are not in such a situationin this case
8-
The public policy ("ordre public") of the European Community
and of its Member States is thus purportedly replaced by U.S.
public policy which European companies are forced to carry out
within ttre 8.C., if they are not to lose export privileges in
the U.S. or to face other sanctions. This is an unacceptable
interference in the affairs of the European Community.
11. Furthermore, it is reprehensible that present U.S. regula-
tions encourage non-U.S. companies to submit "voluntarily"
to this kind of mobilization for U.S..purposes. Even when sub-
mission to a foreign boycott is entirely voluntary, such sub-
mission within the U.S. has been considered to be undesirable
and contrary to U.S. public nolicy(8). By the sErme token, it
must have been evident to the U.S. Government ttrat the statutory
encouragement of voluntary submissi6n to U.S. public policy in
trade matters within the E.C. is strongly conddmned by the
European Community. Private agreenents should not be used in
this way as instrumentF of foreign policy. If a government in
law and in fact slrstematically encourages the inclusion of such
submission clauses in private contracts, freedom of contracts
is misused in order to circumvent the limits imposed on national
jurisdiction by international law.
It is self-evident, moreover, that the existence of such sttb-
mission clauses in certain private contracts cannot serve as
a basis for U.S. regulatory jurisdiction which can proPerly be
exercised soleIy in conformity with international law. Nor can
a company prevent a State from objecting to any infringementr'
which might occur,of the jurisdiction of the State to which it
beLongs. 
./.
(8) Cf. Section 8 of ttre Export Administration Act and below
under II.A
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B. Other Bases of Jurisdiction
L2. lrhere are two ottrer bases of jurisdiction which might be
invoked by tlre U.S. Government, but which have found less ttran
general acceptance under international laril. These are:
(a) the protective principle (para.33 of ttre 2nd Restatenent) ,
which would give a state jurisdiction to proscribe acts 
_
done outside its territory but threatening its security
or the operation of its governmental functions, if such
acts are genera].ly recogrnized as crimes by States with
reasonably developed legal systems;
(b) the so-carred "effects doctrine", under which conduct
occurring outside ttre territory but causing direct,
foreseeable and substantial effects 
- which are also
constituent erements of a crirne or tort - within ttre
-. a
territory may be proscribed (para. L8 of the 2nd Re-
statement).
13. However, it is clear ab initio that the extension of U.S.
jurisdiction impricit in trre amendments cannot be based on
the principles mentioned under 12 (a) or (b).
The 'rprotective principle" has not been invoked by ttre U,S.
Government, since the amendments are based on Section 6 (Foreign
Policy Controls) and not on Section 5 (National Security Controls)
of the Export Administration Act. The U.S. Government itself,
therefore, has not sought to base the amendments on considerations
of national security.
The "effects doctrine" is not applicabl-e. It cannot conceivably
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be argued that exports from the European community to the
u.s.s.R. for the siberian gas pipeline have within the u.s.A.
direct, foreseeable and sr:bstantial effects which are not
merely undesirable, but which constitute an element of a crime
or tort proscribed by u.s. law. rt is more than likely ttrat
they have no direct effects on U.S. trade,
14. For the reasons expor,:nded above, it is crear that the u.s.
measures of June 22, L982 do not find a valid basis in any of
the generally recognized 
- or even the more controversial 
-
principres of internationaL law governing state jurisdiction
to prescribe rures. As a matter of fact the measures by their
extra-territorial character simultaneously infringe the terri-
toriality and nationality principles of jurisdi<ition and are
therefore unlawful under international law.
a
lt
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Iff. The Amendments under U.S. Law
A. u. s. Reactions to l{easures Similar to the June 22
Amendments
15. rf a foreign country were to take measures like the
June 22 Amendments, it is doubtfur whether they would be
in conformity with U.S. law and they would therefore
probably not be recognized and enforced by U.S. Courts.
The kind of mobillzation of E.c. companles for u.s. purposes
to which the Community objects was subject to strong
American reactions and legislative counter-measures, when
U.S. companies were similarly mobilized for the foreign
policy purposes of other States.
The anti-foreign-boycott provisions of Section 8 of the
Export Administration Act are testimony to that. In the same
hray as the U. S. could not accept.- t/rat its compan j.es were
turned into instruments of the forei.gn policy of other
nations, the E.C. cannot accept that its companies must follow
another trade policy than j.ts own within j.ts own territorial
jurisdlctj-on
ft is noteworthy that the anti-boycott provj,sions of the
Export Administration Act can be lnvoked 5-n response to a
boycott that takes a less direct form than the June 22
Amendrnents, namely a boycott which merely tries to dlssuade
persons from dealing with a third country by refusing to trade
with such persons. An export restrlction patterned on the
June 22 Amendments, in contrast, would directly prohiblt a
person from dealing with a parti.cular country under the threat
of government-imposed penalties. Therefore, the latest
amendments would appear to be even more far-reaching than a
t,
,/ .
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boycott which might give rise to the apprication of the
anti-boycott provisions 
.
16. Even if for some reason the foreign boycott provisions
of the Export Ad,ministration Act were not considered. appti-
cabre, a foreign country imposing such restrictions as those
i.mposed by the June 22 Amendments wourd probably be viewed by
U.S. Courts as attempting to extend its law beyond its
terrj.tory without sufficient nexus with the u.s. entity to
justify such an extension. This certainly would be the case
with respect to a mere lj.censee of a foreign concern.
rf a forelgn government complained, that a u.s. lj.censee of a
foreign company was not complying with that foreign govern-
rrentsexport restrictions prohibiting such exports, a U.S.
F'ederal Court would decline jurisdiction, because U.S. Courts
will not enforce foreign penal statutesi9)
If the observance of a foreign 
"*pbrt control by a U.S.
subsidiary or licensee were to become an issue in titigation
between the latter and jts foreign parent cornpany or licensor,
a Federal or State Court would probably not refuse jurisdicti-on,
but would decline to enforce the export restrictions of the
foreign country on the grounds that it would be contrary to
the strong public policy of the forum and not in the interest
of the United States to do 
"o. 
(10)
./.
(9) Wisconsin v. Pelican rnsurance Company, 127 U.S.(1888), Restatement (2nd) conflict of laws Para.
(10) Restatement (2nd) para. 90
265, 290
89.
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This being the reaction of the u.s. legisrator and judiciary
to foreign measures comparable to its own measures of June 22,
the U.S. government should not have l-nflicted these measures
on the E.c. companies concerned, in the virtual knowredge that
these measures would be regarded as unlawful and ineffective
by public authorities in the E.C.
B. Confllcts of Jurisdiction and Accommodatlon of Interest
17. In cases where the conflicting exercise of jurisdiction
to prescribe leads to conflicts of enforcement jurisdiction
between States, each State, according to para. 40 of the
Restatement (2nd) Foreign Relations Law of the U.S., is
required by international law to consider, in good faith,
moderating the exercise of its enforcement jurisdiction. In
this connection, the following factors should be considered:
ttA) Vital national interests of each of the Statesr
-- or
B) The extent and the nature of the hardship that inconsistent
enforcement actions would impose upon the person,
C) The extent to which. the required conduct is to take place
in the territory of the other State,
D) The nationality of the other person...'.
17. Over the past years various U.S. Courts of Appeal have
pronounced themselves in favour of this "balancing of interests"
approach.
rn the case of the Timberlane Co. v. Bank of America(11)
./.
Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Americar 1977-1, Trade(11)
cases No. 61.233
Ir
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Judge choy suggested that comity demanded an evaruation and
balancing of relevant factors, and continued:
"The erements to be weighed include the degree of conflict
with foreign law or poricy, the nationarity of allegiance of
the partj,es, and the locations or principal places of businesses
or corporations, the extent to which enforcement by either State
can be expected to achieve compliance, the relatj.ve significance
of effects on the United States as compared with those elsewhere,
the extent to which there is explicit purpose to harm or affect
American commerce, the foreseeabirity of such effect, and the
relative importance to the violations charged of conduct within
the United States as compared. with conduct abroadn.
A similar approach was followed in Mannj-n 112lIrIills and
is set out in paragraph 40 of the second Restatement.
19. Although this "balancing of interest" approach applies
in the f irst place to Courts, thgr..e 
"r. 
gooa reasons why
the U.S. government should exercj-se such restraint already
at the rule-making stage.
20. First, section 5 ;f the Export Administration Act j.n
several places 
"rrioirr" the President to consider the position
of other countries before taking or extending export controls.
Thus para. (b)3 "...the President shall consider: (3) tne
reaction of other countries to the imposition or expansion of
...export controls by the United States".
./.
l12l Mannington Mills Inc. v. Congoleuln Corp. 1979-1 Trade
cases No. 52.547
ti
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rn para. (d)3 i...the President shall determine that reasonable
efforts have been made to achleve the purposes of the controls
through negotlation or other alternative means".
Finally in para. (g): ,...the presid.ent sha11 take aIl feasible
steps to initiate and conclude negotj.ations for the purpose of
securing the cooperati.on of such foreign governments j-n con-
trolling the export to countrles and consignees to which the
u.s. export contrors appry of any goods or technology comparable
to goods or technology controlred under this section".
21 . rn the second prace, these amend.ments to the Export
Administrati-on regulations may not be subject to substantive
judicial revj-ew. This means that u.s. courts may not be abre
to apply their balancing of interests approach in a crash of
enforcement jurisdictions. rt is therefore appropriate for the
Executive to apply it at the rule-making stage.
22. Finally, the direction in which informed Iegal opinion
in the u.s. is moving on this issue is demonstrated by the
new draft Restatement (3rd) of the Forei_ gn Re lations Law of the
U. S.
It does away with the rather artificial distinction between
the right to assert a jurisdiction to prescribe and restraint
in exercising it. rt simpry considers that the exerclse of a
jurisdictj.on to prescribe may be unreasonable. To decide whether
this is so or not, d.raft para. 403(13) enjoins the evaruation
of such factors as place of the activity to be regurated, links
of persons falling under the regulation with other States,
./
(13) Cited in Harold G. Maier, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction at
a Crossroadss an Intersection between Pub1ic and PrivateInternational Law, 75 American ,fournal of International Law
1982, 280, Ert 300-301.
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consistency with the traditions of the internationar system,
interests of other States in regulating the activity concerned,
and the existence of justified expectatj-ons to be affected by
the regulation.
23. whatever approach is adopted by the u.s. governement in
balancing U.S. interests against the j.nterests of the European
community, the folrowing considerations have been negrected:
- The interest of the European community in regurating the
foreign trade of the nationars of the Member states, in the
territory to which the community Treati.es applyris paramount
over any forei.gn policy purposes that a third country may
have.
- The conduct required by the amendments j.s to take prace
largely in territory to which the E.c. Treaties apply and
not j.n U.S. territory.
- The nationality and other ties of xrany persons whose conduct
is purportedly regulated by th'6 ",June 22 Amend.ments link them
primarily to E.C. Member States and not to the U.S.
- There are justified expectatlons on the part of E.C. companies
which are seriously'h'urt by the U.S. measures.
C. Criteria under Section 5 (b) of the Export Adrninistration Act
24. rt can hardly be claimed that the u.s. measures satisfy
the criteria latd down in the Export Administration Act, 
-and,
therefore it is doubtful whether the restrictions are properry
applied 1n terms of u.s. Iaw. criterion 1 refers to the proba-
bility that the controls will achieve the intended foreign policy
purPoses. Sovlet authorities have clearly stated their intention
to deliver gas to Western Europe as scheduled, and there ls little
reason to doubt their ability to do sor even without American or
European equipment, since the existing Soviet pipeline system
./
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already has sufficlent spare capacityr dt least to cover the
requirements of the early phases of the programme of deliveries.
rf the pipeline is buirt with soviet technorogy and the gasflows on time, these u.s. exports contrors are at best i-neffect_
uaI, and may well be self_defeating,
policy.
as instruments of forej.gn
25' crlterion 3 requires that the reactlon of other countries
to the lrnposition or expansion of such export contrors be takeninto account- rn view of the extra-territorial application, and
retroactive eifect of the U.S. measuresr the European Community
cannot fail to denounce the measure as unlawful under inter_
national Iaw, and in view of their damaging economic andpolitical consequences, has arready protested in the strongest
terms.
26- criterlon 4 requires considerati-on of the effects of the
proposed controls on the export pegforrnance of the united states.
Here again, confirmati.on of the u.s. measures, despite criterion
4, would involve comprete disregard for damaging effectsr,not only
immediately, but also lu.the longer term, owing to the grave
doubts that are bound to arise in future about the u.s. as a
reliable suppli-er of equipment under contractr or as a reliable
partner in technology-ricensing arrangements. This danger has
already been pointed out to the president of the united states
by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce.
D. Compensation for Damage Re.sultinq f rom U. S. Measures
27 - The u-s. measures, inasmuch as they refer to exports from
countries outsi-de the u.s.rare alr the more objectionabler ,.s
they affect contracts that were free from restrictions imposed
bu the u.s- authorities at the time of their conclusion.
./.
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The nain contractors of the Slberian pipeline, a number of
major sub-contractors and suppllers as well as other exporters,
will suffer substantial economic and financial losses for which
no compensation is provided. For many sub-contractors who, for
the most part, have nothing to do with American goods or
technology for gas transport, the practical consequences of
the amendments will be particularly severe and may actually
force them out of business. Lay-offs of a considerable number
of workers will result in any case from the amend.ments.
28. The idea that compensation ls due l-n case private
property or existing contracts are seriously affected by
government action is also familiar in the U.S. legal system.
If the U.S. Qovernment takes private ProPerty by eminent
domai.n it has to compensate the owner. The Supreme Court has
indicated many times that, if regulatory legislation virtually
deprives a person of the complete use and enjoyment of his
property, the law of eminent domain 
.app1ies. 
(141
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Justice Brandeis has written: "It is true that the police Power
embraces regulations designed to promote public convenience or
the general welfare..t .but when particular individuals are
s5-ngled out to bear the cost of advancing the public convenience,
that imposition must bear some reasonable relation to the evils
to be eradicated or the advantages to be secured" (15) , rt is
self-evident that for European contractors and sub-contractors
withln the E.C. the cost imposed uPon them by the amendments
does not bear a reasonable relation to the advantage of furthering
American export PolicY.
./.
(14) l{ost recentlY in Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 359 US 590
594 119521.
(15) Nashville et aI v. Walters,
l,
294 VS 405, 429 (1935)
29. This lack of provision for compensation or protection is
all the more disconcerting, because the Amendments of ilune 22
purport to regulate not merely u.s. external tt"a"r(l5) but
E.C. external trade as well. Moreover, these are considerations
which obviously have played a role in the lmposition of foreign
trade embargoes in the past: Firstly, both the Cuban Assets
Control Regulations (1981) and the lranj-an Assets Control
Regulations 11979) exemptedrto a large extent, foreign incorp-
orated firms with ties to U.S. firms from otherwise stringent
or even absoLute trade prohibitions. (17) Secondly, both the
trade embargo connected with the lranian hostage crisis and the
embargo on grain shipments to the U.S.S.R. permitted existlng
contracts to be honoured.
./
(15) Buttfield v. Stranahan - 192 U.S. 470, 493
indicates t.hat l-nso far as i-t concerns U. S .
( 1 e04)
external
Amendmenttrade, it may be difficult to assert fifth
rights.
(17) This is not to say that the E.c. agrees in principle with
the way in whiih these regulations handle the problem
of extraterritorialitY.
ll
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Monclusion
30. The EuroPean Community considers ttrat ttre amendments to the
Export Administration Regulations of June 22, L982 are unLawful
since they cannot be validly based on anlr of the generally accepted
bases of jurisdiction in international Iaw. Moreover, insofar as
these amendments tend to enlist companies whose main ties are
to the E.c. Memher states for purposes of American trade poricy
vis-a-vis ttre u.s.s.R., they constitute an unacceptable inter-
ference in the independent cormnercial policy of the E.C. Comparable
measures by third states have been rejected by the U.S. in ttre
past.
31. Even from the standpoint of U.S. Iaw, the European Cormnunity
considers that the United States hag. not adopted a proper "balance
of interests" approach. The Eurdlruan Community further considers
that the amendments are of doubtful validity under the criteria
of the Export Administration Act of L979
32. For these reasons, t}re European Community calLs upon the
U.S. authorities to withdraw these measures.
